The PRCIA is my notation for the means by which the tactics of CIA NOC’s and those of COINTELPRO were brought out of the agencies into the corporate world and thus the Northcoast. I made these notes from research done on Nexus Lexus in the late 1980’s when we were trying to understand how to fight Charles Hurwitz, Michael Milken and John Connally all at once.
Theory: There has been a strong relationship between the intelligence community and the business community.
In the following the names may be problems. If wiki won’t tell you, email me at firstname.lastname@example.org.
William Casey was a Wall Street Attorney and a tax shelter specialist. He published several books on getting rich. He had been an OSS officer during WWII.
Casey founded the National Security Information Center (NSIC), close to the Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS). These were tied to the CIA and to the Heritage Foundation.
Since this was during the Kennedy and early Viet Nam years it seen aas a reaction to Nixon’s defeat and Kennedy’s foreign policy around Cuba and Viet Nam. These policies were counter to Casey’s world view.
1971 Nixon Era
In 1961 John B Connally after spending a decade as private counsel for independent oil operators, Sid Richardson and Perry Richardson Bass, became Kennedy’s Secretary of the Navy. He served as the Governor of Texas 1962-1969 when he became a partner in Vinson, Elkins, Searls, Connally and Smith based in Houston. Vinson-Elkins had numerous middle eastern clients. During the early 70’s H K Beebe and Texas’soon-to-be scandal-ridden ex-Lt Governor Ben Barnes developed a complex business association involving a number of Savings and Loan association.
Connally formed the Business Roundtable. It was his idea to organize corporate CEO’s outside of a political party’s control. He began to organize the economic strangulation of Chile based upon the corporate power of the Business Roundtable. The First City National Bank of Houston was affected by and feared the new economic policies of Chile. First City NB through its relation to Connally’s law firm supported his efforts.
Connally served as the Secretary of the Treasury and a member of the President Nixon’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). He was soon run out of Treasury due to a monetary scandal and was moved to Under-secretary of State for Monetary Policy and the Export-Import Bank from where he continued to increase the economic blockade of Chile.
Casey was nominated by Nixon to the SEC chair. The nomination hearings focused upon an alleged illegal sale of Advanced Devices Inc stock in 1961-1962 which was unregistered by the SEC. A lawsuit charged Casey and described him as in control of ADI. The suit was settled in 1964 with Casey denying he had control of ADI.
Another suit against Casey prior to his nomination claimed he had engaged in plagiarism in his publishing. Yet another claimed he had engineered excessive payments to acquire S O Systems for Kalvar Corp. Casey was also identified as related to L H Rothschilds Inc. There is also the possibility that Casey is related to Transcontinental Services Group [See Hurwitz’ History]through the Rothschilds or through Harold Geneen, TSG director and ex-CEO of ITT.
ITT wanted to overthrow the elected government of Chile. It made a $400 thousand donation to the Committee to re-elect Nixon (CREEP). It is believed that Casey, at the SEC, withheld from a Congressional investigation the relevant documents which would have exposed Connally’s role in securing this contribution.
Barnes became involved in a bank and stock fraud scandal in which a group of Texas banks were looted by a group of businessmen who bought and sold stock in a business owned by Frank Sharp-The Sharpstown Scandal.
Following the overthrow of the Chilean government Connally was placed on the Board of Directors of First City National Bank. The President of First City was James A Elkins. Connally, also, switched his party allegiance from Democrat to Republican.
The Sharpstown Scandal led to Barnes’ resignation and to a 1974 indictment of Connally for allegedly accepting a bribe from an attorney of a defendant in the Sharpstown Scandal. The attorney claimed to be acting on behalf of the Dairy industry. Connally was acquitted.
Carl Lindner was a powerful member of the Dairy industry. Was he involved in this?
Casey served on the PFIAB.
THE DISMAL SCIENCE
THE SEARCH FOR BETTER ECONOMIC POLICY.OCT. 28 2008 7:07 AM
They Made a Killing
Did people who knew about secret, CIA-led coups use that information to game the stock market?
By Ray Fisman
In 1951, Jacobo Árbenz Gúzman became Guatemala’s second democratically elected president. Árbenz’s authoritarian predecessors had been very sympathetic to American business interests, particularly those of the United Fruit Co. (now Chiquita), which had bought up land titles on the cheap from Guatemala’s corrupt elite for its ever-expanding banana empire. Once in office, Presidente Árbenz sought to take it all back, nationalizing UFC’s Guatemalan assets and redistributing them to the poor.
But UFC had friends in very high places—the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, John Moor Cabot, was the brother of UFC President Thomas Cabot. The secretary of state himself, John Foster Dulles, had done legal work for UFC, and his brother Allen Dulles was director of the CIA and also on UFC’s board. Thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, we now know that the various Cabots and Dulleses had a series of top-secret meetings in which they decided that Árbenz had to go and sponsored a coup that drove Árbenz from office in 1954.
With a U.S. puppet back in the president’s mansion, UFC’s profits were safe. But it appears the company wasn’t the only beneficiary of this Cold War cloak-and-dagger diplomacy: A recent study by economists Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu argues that those in on the planning process also profited handsomely. By tracking the stock prices of UFC and other politically vulnerable firms in the months leading up to CIA-staged coups in Guatemala, Chile, Cuba, and Iran, the researchers provide evidence that someone—perhaps one of the Dulleses, Cabots, or others in the know—was trading stocks based on classified information of these coups-in-the-making.
This exposé is a contribution to the rapidly expanding field of “forensic economics,” which tries to understand the who, what, and why of illicit transactions. Since these are activities that take place out of sight (at least when they’re done right), researchers are forced to look for fingerprints left in the data by smugglers, bribe-taking politicians, and other lawbreakers.
Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu examine how the stock market reacted to events that no Wall Street trader should have known about: top-secret meetings of the coup-plotting cabals at CIA headquarters and presidential approvals of CIA-organized invasions. These events would have increased the expected future profits of companies like UFC—if the CIA-led coup in Guatemala were successful, for example, UFC would get its plantations back. If stock traders were privy to the coup-planning process, we would expect them to bid up the prices of affected companies in anticipation of these higher profits. These meetings and authorizations were all highly classified, however, and since you can’t trade on information you don’t have, UFC’s stock price shouldn’t have budged until the coup actually took place and the investing world learned of the regime change.
Unless, that is, some of the Cabots, Dulleses, or other insiders were using their privileged information to profit personally from a future coup. To understand why insider trading would boost a company’s stock price, suppose that someone in on the planning—perhaps at UFC or at the State Department itself—started quietly buying up cheap UFC stock in anticipation of the price jump that would come when the coup took place (or tipped off his stock-trading cousins about the future boost to UFC so they could do the same). All of this pre-coup buying would increase demand for UFC stock, bidding up its price even before CIA operatives actually got to work overthrowing the Guatemalan government.
Such trading on inside information is illegal, and when it involves highly classified details about a future CIA coup, it verges on treason. Yet the researchers found that prices of companies affected by the CIA’s regime-toppling efforts—UFC in Guatemala, Anglo-Iranian (oil) in Iran, Anaconda (mining) in Chile, and American Sugar in Cuba—went up in the weeks and months preceding the coups. (The authors restrict their analysis to coups for which they had access to declassified planning documents and for which U.S. companies had had property nationalized by the targeted regimes.)
Furthermore, these gains were concentrated in the days following crucial government authorizations or plans for the coup (suggesting the trades weren’t simply the result of good guesswork about a coup in the making). For example, in the week that President Eisenhower gave full approval to Operation PBFortune to overthrow Árbenz, UFC’s price went up by 3.8 percent; the stock market overall was flat that week.
In all, shares of coup-affected companies went up by a total of 10 percent following top-secret authorizations, swamping the 3.5 percent gain that came immediately in the coups’ aftermaths. If information hadn’t been leaking into the stock market via insider trading, then the entire impact of the coup should have appeared only when the very public invasions took place and the investing world finally got news of the regime change. Unfortunately, there are limits to what these stock-market forensics can uncover. When the researchers contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission to find out who was trading on these days, they learned that there are limits to what the Freedom of Information Act could provide. So, we can’t pin the apparent insider trading on anyone in particular.
There’s also some evidence, albeit tentative, that the market was very good at forecasting the coups’ success and failure—a further indication that the traders driving up the price had detailed knowledge of the covert plans (and their expected outcomes). The CIA-led invasion of Cuba is referred to these days as the Bay of Pigs fiasco for a reason, and whoever was trading on insider knowledge seemed to place his bets accordingly—the pre-invasion increase in American Sugar’s stock price was much lower than the gains for companies affected by the other, successful coups in the study.
What about the forensic economics of the Bush administration? Researchers have already estimated what it’s worth for Republican-connected companies to have George W. Bush in the White House by looking at what happened to the stock prices of companies with former Republican lawmakers on their boards when Al Gore gave up his fight for the presidency on Dec. 13, 2000 (they went up; Democratically connected companies’ prices went down).
If and when the story behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq becomes public, researchers will surely also be analyzing the share prices of the many companies that profited from a U.S.-occupied Iraq. None will see greater scrutiny than oil services giant Halliburton, whose former CEO Dick Cheney left the company to become vice president in 2000 and undoubtedly took part in the invasion’s planning. (Some say he was pivotal in the decision to invade.) In the Iraq war’s aftermath, Halliburton received billions in no-bid reconstruction contracts, boosting its profits and leading to accusations of corruption.
Halliburton’s stock price jumped 7.6 percent the day the Senate authorized the use of force in Iraq, so investors clearly anticipated that war would be good for the company. Did insiders also profit from advance notice of these sweetheart deals to come? Conspiracy theorists will no doubt be interested in what happened to Halliburton stock on days when less-public meetings took place. Cheney himself certainly could not have traded on any inside information—monitoring of insider trades and stock transactions is much more sophisticated now than it was in the 1950s. But perhaps others in the V.P.’s office or at Halliburton (or their cousins, or their cousins’ cousins) might have been able to do some trading on the sly. If so, they may have left tracks in the data for researchers to follow.
Ray Fisman is a professor of economics at the Columbia Business School and co-author of The Org: The Underlying Logic of the Office. Follow him on Twitter.